Incentive Mechanism Design for Crowdsourcing: An All-Pay Auction Approach

Incentive Mechanism Design for Crowdsourcing: An All-Pay Auction Approach
Title:
Incentive Mechanism Design for Crowdsourcing: An All-Pay Auction Approach
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ACM Transactions on Intelligent Systems and Technology
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Publication Date:
01 April 2016
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Abstract:
Crowdsourcing can be modeled as a principal-agent problem in which the principal (crowdsourcer) desires to solicit a maximal contribution from a group of agents (participants) while agents are only motivated to act according to their own respective advantages. To reconcile this tension, we propose an all-pay auction approach to incentivize agents to act in the principal’s interest, i.e., maximizing profit, while allowing agents to reap strictly positive utility. Our rationale for advocating all-pay auctions is based on two merits that we identify, namely all-pay auctions (i) compress the common, two-stage “bid-contribute” crowdsourcing process into a single “bid-cum-contribute” stage, and (ii) eliminate the risk of task nonfulfillment. In our pro- posed approach, we enhance all-pay auctions with two additional features: an adaptive prize and a general crowdsourcing environment. The prize or reward adapts itself as per a function of the unknown winning agent’s contribution, and the environment or setting generally accommodates incomplete and asymmetric information, risk-averse (and risk-neutral) agents, and a stochastic (and deterministic) population. We an- alytically derive this all-pay auction-based mechanism and extensively evaluate it in comparison to classic and optimized mechanisms. The results demonstrate that our proposed approach remarkably outperforms its counterparts in terms of the principal’s profit, agent’s utility, and social welfare.
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© ACM 2016. This is the author's version of the work. It is posted here for your personal use. Not for redistribution. The definitive Version of Record was published in ACM Transactions on Intelligent Systems and Technology (TIST), http://dx.doi.org/10.1145/2837029.
ISSN:
2157-6904
2157-6912
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