An efficient and truthful pricing mechanism for team formation in crowdsourcing markets

An efficient and truthful pricing mechanism for team formation in crowdsourcing markets
Title:
An efficient and truthful pricing mechanism for team formation in crowdsourcing markets
Other Titles:
2015 IEEE International Conference on Communications (ICC)
Keywords:
Publication Date:
08 June 2015
Citation:
Q. Liu, T. Luo, R. Tang and S. Bressan, "An efficient and truthful pricing mechanism for team formation in crowdsourcing markets," 2015 IEEE International Conference on Communications (ICC), London, 2015, pp. 567-572. doi: 10.1109/ICC.2015.7248382
Abstract:
In a crowdsourcing market, a requester is looking to form a team of workers to perform a complex task that requires a variety of skills. Candidate workers advertise their certified skills and bid prices for their participation. We design four incentive mechanisms for selecting workers to form a valid team (that can complete the task) and determining each individual worker's payment. We examine profitability, individual rationality, computational efficiency, and truthfulness for each of the four mechanisms. Our analysis shows that TruTeam, one of the four mechanisms, is superior to the others, particularly due to its computational efficiency and truthfulness. Our extensive simulations confirm the analysis and demonstrate that TruTeam is an efficient and truthful pricing mechanism for team formation in crowdsourcing markets.
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PublisherCopyrights
Funding Info:
Description:
(c) 2015 IEEE. Personal use of this material is permitted. Permission from IEEE must be obtained for all other users, including reprinting/ republishing this material for advertising or promotional purposes, creating new collective works for resale or redistribution to servers or lists, or reuse of any copyrighted components of this work in other works.
ISSN:
1550-3607
1938-1883
ISBN:
978-1-4673-6432-4
978-1-4673-6431-7
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